Overview
With the advent of the WWW, there is considerable interest in developing a runtime infrastructure for mobile code. In the mobile programming model [CHK95, Tho97, CPV97] , programs, called mobile programs in this paper, have the ability to compute at a host, stop their execution, migrate to another host, and continue their execution. Mobile programs are appealing because they support efficient utilization of network resources and extensibility of information servers. Also, the model is ideally suited for extensible distributed system structures such as the Internet.
However, since they cross administrative domains during their executions, they have the ability to access a site's protected resources. In this paper, we present an approach that allows a site to control access to its conceptual resources -resources which are explicitly called and have well-defined interfaces. Examples of conceptual resources include file systems, window managers, and database servers. In this approach, a site enumerates a set of constraints on accesses to its resources. A set of tools enforce This work is supported by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and Rome Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-97-1-0221. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), Rome Laboratory, or the U.S. Government. these constraints on a mobile program by integrating the code for checking access constraints into the Java classes that form both the mobile program and the resources. Executions of the resulting mobile program satisfy all access constraints imposed by the site, thereby protecting its resources.
This approach depends only on the ability to recognize accesses to resources. Any language that provides identifiable interfaces to resources can be used.
Mechanism
Our mechanism consists of two parts: a policy language for specifying access constraints and a tool for enforcing the constraints.
Our policy language is a simple declarative language of the form, deny(C1:M1? > C2:M2) when B. This states that method M1 of class C1 cannot invoke method M2 of class C2 when B is true. The when clause can be omitted, in which case B defaults to true, indicating that access should always be denied. Likewise, M1 and/or M2 can also be omitted, implying that access should be denied to any method of the given class. Further, the subject C1:M1 can be omitted, resulting in no class accessing C2:M2. The boolean expression B can be based on the parameters of the methods or the state of the system. The format of the boolean expression is similar to Java boolean expressions. Elements of the boolean expression can include method invocations, fields of the object and parameters of the method. An example is #N:X op V , where N specifies either the subject object C1 or the target object C2. X is specifies the parameter of the method. op is a comparison operator and V is some value. These simple boolean constaints should be enough for most access constraints. However, in order to provide a more extensible system, the policy language also has an add command for adding a security class object which can be used for implementing more general procedural access constraints.
Access constraints are inherited by a class's subclass. They cannot be overridden, although they can be strengthened. For example, suppose R2 is a subclass of R1 and we have the two constraints: deny(P? > R1) when B1 and deny(P? > R2) when B2. Then the actual constraint for P accessing R2 is deny(P? > R2) when B1 or B2.
The editing tool takes the access constraint statements and inserts code into the Java classfiles in order to make sure that the constrained method is only invoked when B is not true. If B is true, then a security exception is thrown. The location where this code is added depends on the type of the policy statement. For statements of the form deny(C1:M1? > C2:M2) when B, the constraint check is added to the code body of method M1 of class C1 before each method invocation of C2:M2. For statements of the form deny(? > C2:M2) when B, it is more efficient to include the constraint check within the body of the code for C2:M2. Thus, we edit both incoming mobile programs and the interfaces for local resources.
Performance
We performed experiments on a 266 MHz Pentium II running Red Hat Linux 5.0. We compared this approach with the Java's security manager [AG96] . In Java, one sets a security policy by creating a security manager class and setting it as the system's security manager. Then, each protected resource makes a call to the system to get the security manager and another to the security manager to check if access is allowed.
We incur a small one time overhead of about 0.08 seconds for reading a small policy file and modifying a small class file. However, execution time is superior to Java's security manager approach. Our approach inlines security checking code and avoids the overhead of the method invocations.
